Half a century after independence, African elites, at least those in conflict-ridden countries, often live in constant fear for their life. Real or invented coup attempts, political assassinations, beatings of opposition leaders, the distribution of death lists, etc. have a profoundly traumatizing and self-perpetuating effect. Purges, not least in the security apparatus, are not uncommon, particularly after changes in government, be they peaceful or violent. These purges come at a cost: the excluded elites are frequently tempted to use violence to come back into the "dining room"-and the excluding government tries to prevent reentry by all means.
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I Introduction
When cause and effect can no longer be distinguished, when it has become difficult to know where to start dealing with a problem, and when "more of the same" is the consequence of a calamity, it is not uncommon to talk of a "trap." Many African states' elites are in an insecurity trap, as perpetrators and victims. Taming the political game and playing it according to accepted and enforced rules is arguably what most African politicians would prefer to do. They may, however, believe that they cannot. Paul Collier et al. (2003:10) define what is called a conflict trap: "Once a country has had a conflict it is in far greater danger of further conflict: commonly, the chief legacy of a civil war is another war." In fact, with the help of statistical methods, Collier et al. test a number of correlations and find that the fact that there was a conflict is most conducive to more conflict-more than any other variables tested. The purpose of this paper is to be more precise, focusing on one crucial conflict factor (elite insecurity). A more qualitative design is pursued in order to make it plausible that elites can be confined in an "insecurity trap," suffering from and perpetuating acts which instill ever more distrust and pave the way to the widespread use of violence.
Distrust may be defined as "a disposition hindering individuals from interacting with others and relying on institutions," and can be seen as the opposite of trust. Bauer and Dobler (2008:2-3) , in their effort to better grasp the meaning of the multidimensional phenomenon of trust, first make the general statement that
[t]rust in its most general sense is the assumption that others will act in a particular way. As trust is oriented towards the future and not based on knowledge, people must be willing to interact without a guarantee in trusting other people or institutions. Trust as an attitude depends on experience and expectations and involves a sense of the other's competence, motivation and intentions.
They further distinguish between basic a) social trust, b) personal trust, c) institutional trust, and d) normative trust. For the purpose of this paper, institutional trust is probably essential. According to Bauer and Dobler, with institutional trust "people assume that they can trust a particular institution, for instance that the police will protect them. Trust in a person is institutional when we for instance assume that a civil servant as a representative of state administration will provide the services we have the right to receive." The opposite, institutional distrust, can be easily derived from this definition and may be the outcome of what will be described and analyzed in this contribution. However, some elements of personal trust between top politicians (trust "based on numerous former, personal interactions") may play a role for this analysis as well. It should be stated from the outset that trust/distrust is not seen as the cause of elite insecurity, but rather as an aggravating or prolonging factor of intra-elite struggles.
The paper is structured into two main parts: In the first part, as an integral part of this introduction, a number of clarifications have to be made:
• Who are the elites?
• What do they fear?
• What are their responses?
• How is the insecurity trap constituted?
The second part of the paper describes in some detail the relevant aspects of three conflictridden African countries:
• Central African Republic
• Côte d'Ivoire
• Liberia
All country -cases are presented following the same pattern: 1) elite security needs are described, 2) patterns of elite exclusion are detailed, 3) the available state services are rated, and 4) the role of externally based elite protection (private and public) is analyzed.
Materials used are essentially secondary sources: UN Security Council and media/Internet reports, preferably from local sources. All countries have been visited by the author once (Liberia) or several times.
The second part of the paper is also devoted to a comparative analysis which tests some preliminary hypotheses. What the three countries have in common is the experience of widespread conflict, a high number of elite assassinations, and the traumatizing effects of regime changes. They differ, however, in at least three respects:
• Two countries (Liberia and Central African Republic) are comparatively small, and the size of the elite in both countries is equally small. Côte d'Ivoire is much bigger and has a comparatively large elite. The underlying hypothesis is that this could have an effect on trust/distrust (the smaller the elite, the higher the distrust), and also-in an opposite way-on the ability to provide security (the bigger the elite, the more difficult it is to protect it).
• Central African Republic (CAR) and Côte d'Ivoire are former French colonies and for a long time undertook intense military cooperation with France, thereby affecting expectations of outside intervention in the case of violent attempts to overthrow governments. Liberia was not a French colony (underlying hypothesis: French military presence leads to improved elite security).
• The crises of Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire received relatively strong international attention, also during the search for peace agreements, and translated into strong UN engagements, while CAR only seriously entered the international agenda after the Darfur crisis and more decisively only in 2007. The "international engagement factor" in peacemaking and security provision can be described and analyzed with CAR as the control case (weak international engagement leads to higher elite insecurity).
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This means that the "small-size" factor, the "French factor," and the "UN factor" will be particularly tested according to the comparative perspective.
The third part of this paper is a sort of conclusion. The effects of the above factors are rated and alternative explanations are briefly developed.
Who Are the Elites?
It is not obvious who belongs to the elite of a given African country; sometimes selfascription may differ from what can be "objectively" said about the composition of an elite.
Above all, there are different understandings of the elite. The academic literature detailing definitions of elites can be distinguished into roughly three categories: a sociological view on elite dominance dealing with elites as the top social stratum (e.g. Mills, for Africa : Bayart 1 Note that Lambach (2007: 12) explores the usefulness of the oligopoly of violence paradigm for different types of post-conflict countries with the main distinction being "intervention" versus "non-intervention." 1989); studies on the importance of a narrower group of people influencing the outcome of democratic transitions (e.g. Quantin 1995 , Villalón/Von Doepp 2005 , sometimes simply reinventing themselves in this process (Daloz 1999 , Hillebrand 1993 Another qualification is necessary with regard to elite security: the strategies of the rich and poor to provide themselves with security are usually different. In their study of private security companies in Kenya, Mkutu and Sabala (2007: 400) note that " [t] he wealthy are turning their homes into fortresses, hiring security guards with elaborate alarm systems, and wiring their walls with electrified fences capped with razor and electric wires, while the poor in the slums hurry home in matatus before sunset or hire vigilantes such as Mungiki and the Taliban."
Mkutu and Sabala acknowledge that "even ministers and foreign diplomats have been targets of thefts and shootings." It is evident from this quote that a) in a context of poverty rich people attract criminals and b) in a context of state weakness they might not get sufficient protection from the police services. Hence, they turn to private services. However, while elites usually are rich, they are not identical with the rich. They have particular security concerns, different from those of "the rich" and largely linked to their political function; they therefore turn to specialized (semi)private services when they do not trust public security forces.
What Do They Fear?
It is true, elites are usually better equipped and have other opportunities to protect themselves than ordinary people. On the other hand, they may be visible targets of criminal acts-and above all politically motivated violence. Intra-elite confrontation including physical violence is a common phenomenon in Africa. When talking about trust as an essential element of security-or the subjective side of security-it might be tempting to analyze intra-elite trust rather than what the common citizen has to say about it.
2 Intra-elite distrust may be traced back to the origins of a conflict escalation pattern familiar in Africa: the breakdown of a neopatrimonial regime. The main characteristics of neopatrimonialism are the absence of a division between the private and the public sphere and the dominance of clientelism over formal procedures, although rational-legal facades persist (Médard 1977 : 67-74, Engel/Erdmann 2007 . Elite accommodation is a function of the distribution of sinecures in such a system. The well-embedded economic deficiencies of neopatrimonial systems, the dynamics of the education system (multiplication of elite aspirants), and unfavorable world market conditions for major export commodities moved numerous African regimes close to implosion as early as the 1980s. The incapacity to maintain the logic of distribution led to conflicts-sometimes violent ones (Allen 1999 In different papers, I have argued that the lack of knowledge about the security perceptions of the larger population in Africa is most dramatic and needs to be overcome by concentrating research here. However, it would be wrong not to acknowledge that elite security concerns are very relevant too. This paper focuses on one side of the coin, without claiming that it is the only one that needs to be carefully polished in order to clearly discern the embossment of "African security." 3 Mkandawire (2002: 185) rightly points to some fluidity in this argument, as neopatrimonial regimes "have taken a wide range of turns, including violent collapse, bureaucratisation and democratisation." It may be argued that others have survived more or less unaltered, although the "spoils system" was at times overstretched by using electoral manipulation and repression (Cameroon and Gabon would be cases to be considered). However, the mechanism of declining patronage capacities plus exclusion is too common a story to be neglected. the security apparatus, making it particularly interesting to be recruited in such an elite corps. Accusations that presidents favor fellow tribesmen for recruitment into their own presidential guard are not rare. This recruitment pattern is highly problematic. A change of regime engendering a change in the ethnic identity of the head of state may then mean that the presidential guard has to be both politically and ethnically purged, creating a number of difficult-to-handle losers-frequently well trained, once particularly privileged, and now sidelined or kicked out and frustrated. This is a group to be watched, and a good number of new heads of state are nervous about such groups.
What Constitutes the Elite Insecurity Trap?
The emergence of an exclusive government elite in the neopatrimonial context is an important conflict factor. The escalation mechanism is as follows: After a change in government or as a result of a shrinking political arena, key decision-making positions in the presidency, cabinet, parliament, military, and judiciary do not-or no longer-include the elite representatives of major identity groups. In addition, and on a lower level, most jobs in the civil service, police force, and army are reserved for members of one or two specific social or identity groups. Institutional devices may be established to guarantee a more permanent exclusion of counter-elites (for example, high thresholds to win mandates in parliament; constitutional provisions tailor-made to prohibit specific candidates from standing, such as age -limits; etc.).
The already privileged circles usually have better means for keeping their jobs or accessing opportunities in times of crisis. Exclusion could become a rational strategy for them. Since exclusion is not only a rational but also a radical strategy employed by those in power, responses tend to be radical as well, leading to a rapid deterioration of intergroup relations and to polarization (Lemarchand 2001) . There haven't always been such dramatic consequences with a change of government, but a clear escalation pattern can be identified:
At first, a specific group might simply enjoy privileged, but not exclusive access to strategic positions. Gradually, the government payroll is "homogenized," and only one group is left represented. positions are hardened in a spiraling way. When, finally, the arrangements concluded at a dialogue forum (or the like) are not respected, even more profound distrust settles in and become a serious obstacle to a settlement.
II Case Studies on Elite (In)security from a Comparative Perspective
This section will provide more insights into the main aspects of elite security in three countries: Central African Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, and Liberia. In each of the case studies a subsection will be devoted to each of elite security needs, patterns of elite exclusion, state services, and the role of externally based elite protection (whether private or public).
Central African Republic
Elite Security Needs
Central African Republic (CAR) is a small country with a small political elite. Virtually At least eight high-ranking military officers were killed under Bokassa's rule. In some cases close family members were killed as well, apparently out of fear at facing retaliation from them.
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The only major elite victim was opposition heavyweight Dr. Conjugo, killed by gendarmes during a protest march in 1991. The direct responsibility of Kolingba could not be established.
French hospital, followedonly a short time later by his son Hervé, it was interpreted by some as another assassination (poison attack), 13 although the event was not completely elucidated.
Not only politicians were targeted: in 1999 the influential trade union leader Sonny Cole was shot at and arrested by the presidential guard and beaten. Kolingba. Gun shots were exchanged between the security guards of the former president and unknown elements. The government later declared that soldiers on duty along the Ubangi River had accidentally shot their guns off and that no attempt on the life of Kolingba, a candidate in the elections, had been made. Evidently, the interpretation on the side of Bozizé's opponent was different.
Grelombe's assassination was named frequently in the same context as the murder of the prefect of Bozoum, Col. Rehote, with a number of relatives (one younger brother) in 1997 and of Lt. Bodo in Kolingba's home region of Kembe, in 1999 . See Sangonet, 22 November 1999 This led to a short uprising by youth in the Boy Raabe neighborhood, a rather serious situation as Mandaba was thought to be the main organizer of the so- 
Patterns of Elite Exclusion
CAR is a classic example of the terrible dynamics of elite exclusion: One of the features of Patassé's presidency was the sidelining of the followers of the former head of state, Gen.
Kolingba. It is true that Kolingba favored his fellow Yakoma in recruiting his army and presidential guard. But the new, democratically elected regime simply proceeded in the opposite way, drawing its new recruits primarily from the home region of President Patassé.
This was interpreted-and could well be interpreted-by the old guard as a strategy of exclusion. Exclusion is particularly resented in societies that are based on zero-sum beliefs, which is very much present in the rhetorical formula "partition of the national cake. Wafio, vice president of the National Assembly, were arrested and tortured. Whether the motivation of such acts can be found in a strategy of "deterrence" or that of a "preemptive strike" is difficult to assert.
With François Bozizé's violent takeover in March 2003, history again repeated itself: he immediately sidelined Patassé's followers in the security apparatus. Bozizé was well placed to take those decisions as he was the former chief of staff, with insider knowledge about the apparatus. Core elements of Patassé's recruits ended up taking part in the Armée pour la
Restauration de la République et la Démocratie (APRD) rebellion in the northwest of the country. Bozizé was lucky that they did not have the time and opportunity to take along modern equipment and weapons. However, there is no doubt that these elements were highly motivated to oust the new regime. This motivation was also strong among the so- 
No major studies on security provision in Côte d'Ivoire were published during the entire Houphouët era. However, it is safe to assume that only with the third wave of Additionally, the right to stand at elections was limited to those candidates who could prove they had Ivorian parents (both father and mother); this was seen as a direct consequence of the "Ivoirité" ideology. The move had a clear exclusionary motivation, and it led to the partly violent "boycott actif" of the 1995 presidential elections by the two major opposition parties, the Rassemblement des Républicains (RDR, Ouattara's party) and the FPI. Both assumed they would be cheated in manipulated elections.
The coup in 1999 can be interpreted in different ways as it developed from a simple mutiny, but it was certainly also the expression of growing distrust inside the country's elite. This meant that state sinecures were extended to "rebel ministers," as well as to the two main opposition parties. Although perhaps not intended to be so, the Gbagbo governments were all rather inclusive, 40 but the inclusion stopped at this level. The security apparatus, the state media, and the para-state companies were brought under party control.
State Services
Houphouët-Boigny used the first alleged coup plots in the 1960s as a pretext to create a party militia composed predominantly of ethnic Baoulé kinsmen to maintain order in Sherman, standard bearer of the Liberia Action Party (LAP). 52 However, the credibility of this witness was doubtful. In the end, both officers were acquitted in May 2008. Whatever the truth is, the continuation of extreme distrust among the elite is tangible.
Patterns of Elite Exclusion
The exact population of Liberia is unknown, but has been variously put at some 3.2 million.
With a comparable population to CAR, and an equally bad standard of human development and organizational differentiation, an estimate of 400-500 elite members, as earlier estimated for CAR, may be a fair guess. The exclusion pattern is, however, different and includes security-relevant aspects.
The state of Liberia established itself slowly after independence (1820/1847). The coastal zone around Monrovia was the effective center and control over the hinterland was only gradually organized. A clear split between the so-called Americo-Liberians, returned slaves from the US whose descendants became the political and economic elite of the country, and the rest of the population could be observed. The exclusive rule by a handful of prominent families was as oppressive as colonial rule in neighboring countries and was also heavily and this was not the least important factor in the start of the civil war in late 1989.
Charles Taylor, the strongest competitor in this civil war and elected president of Liberia from 1997 to 2003 was Americo-Liberian, although from a modest family (Ellis 1999: 67) ; his coming to power was not interpreted as a revenge act of the old elite. One obvious reason for this was that after 1980 very few Liberians would have dared to call themselves Americo-Liberians. Ethnic identity is subject to construction, and it was wise to belong to just any "indigenous" ethnic group one had family relations with. But how much had really changed? Ellis (1999: 281) As Doe predominantly recruited personnel from two Krahn clans, Ellis (1990: 56) Charles Taylor's army was elected senator, as was Jewel Taylor, former wife of Taylor. In the cases of Johnson and Dolo, it might be that voters "responded more to fears of future insecurity than to a sense of gratitude for past services" when electing them (Sawyer 2008: 195 One year later he stumbled over a vote of no-confidence, was reinstated by the Supreme Court, but then finally resigned. Some background can be found in Africa Confidential, 2 February 2007. 60 Stephen Ellis: Liberia, in: Africa Yearbook 2006 , Leiden: Brill 2007 There are of course elected legislators with a less intriguing past, and they even form a majority. It will be of interest to see how they interact with their famous / dreaded colleagues.
State Services
Liberia shows some remarkable continuity with regard to the state structures responsible for presidential security. The National Security Agency ( Taylor was very suspicious about his own security and maintained parallel and competing security services led by rival commanders. 62 The first battalion of the presidential guard was commanded by his own son Chuckie. In addition to the special branch NSA, a particular Special Security Service (SSS) has existed since 1966. The SSS was created as a special unit to provide for all the security needs of the incumbent president. This included, for example, the physical protection of the president, his/her immediate family, and certain officials and visiting dignitaries, as well as the protection of the executive mansion. In 2005, the transitional government approved a new structure for the SSS and authorized a full strength of 395 members (down from 1,287), including 35 civilian staff. 63 The transitional government was, however, unable to raise the $900,000 required to fund the demobilization of the excess personnel. In the end, 870 SSS officers were deactivated with US financial assistance. 64 It might be of interest to note that the SSS received mostly a "negative" or "disputed" rating by participants in focus group discussions conducted in 2005 (in the framework of a research project on security perceptions 65 ), maybe due to its record during the Taylor years. In government and UN circles the belief manifested itself that these existing instruments of "elite security" would not be enough. In March 2007 it was decided that over the next five years, a 500-strong quick-reaction police force, in addition to the 3,500 existing police personnel, would have to be formed. This specialized unit, whose personnel would be drawn initially from the 200-strong Liberian National Police Support Unit, would have "the capacity to respond quickly, efficiently and robustly to major breaches of internal security." 66 62 Ellis (1999) alludes several times to the Israeli security advisors to President Doe, who in the end could not prevent his downfall. The US government, on the other hand, was reluctant to engage in presidential or more broad-based elite protection over the entire period of 1980-
2003.
Concerning the security of the current governing elite in Liberia, the ongoing UNMIL mission, one of the most substantial UN missions ever with a maximum strength of 15,000, seems to be a sufficient guarantee that the current government cannot be toppled by President Johnson-Sirleaf put it differently: ʺLiberia, the U.S. historic ally, has stood resolutely with the United States, through good times and bad, and is offering its territory as it has done in the past, for the establishment of AFRICOM headquarters.ʺ 68 In early 2008 the US government decided to maintain AFRICOM headquarters "for the foreseeable future" in Stuttgart, Germany, without deciding on a permanent location. 69 In light of the discussions that Liberians had-AFRICOM would actually endanger security by making Liberia a target of terrorist attacks, as well as speculations about the buying of Johnson-Sirleaf's conscience by the US government 70 -and also in light of the record of the French military presence for regime stability in the subregion, this might not be considered a big loss.
III Conclusion
The elements of interest can be briefly summarized in a synopsis (see Table 1 The methodology is kind of opaque: a special software indexes and scans "hundreds of thousands of opensource articles and reports" using "a powerful data-collection system that includes international and local media reports and other public documents." www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_content &task=view&id=229&Itemid=366 (access 16 June 2008)
Other results found here are as follows:
• All in all, the differences in terms of elite security needs-for those in power as well as for alternative elites-are very slim among the cases examined.
• Since all three countries offer a very insecure environment for their elites, it appears understandable that the entire range of reactions (creating personal and parallel security services, cooperating intensely with outsiders and private security companies, self-exile, etc.) can be identified.
• A substantial size and an appropriate mandate for peacekeeping missions may have an impact on elite security.
• The achievements of private security companies, however, appear limited.
• The insistence on the loyalty of presidential guards, which translates into their ethnic homogenization, has fostered rather than ameliorated elite distrust.
Perhaps other factors have still more explanatory value. At least as a context factor, the course of the transition seems to play a role, but might be even more important. The case for observing transition courses and outcomes in order to predict "insecurity traps" is rather While no blueprint for the way out of the "insecurity trap" can be developed here, it appears that elite exclusion-the main driving force of violent intra-elite competition-cannot simply be reversed by including the formerly excluded into extended governments. This would be tantamount to reproducing a neopatrimonial logic that has already proved to be unsustainable. Trust can only be rebuilt over time, when competing elites believe that the rules of the game are respected by all the main competitors and when institutions prove their functionality (and more than once!).
